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by Ralph Townsend  
Central Maine Power's efforts to buy out the Fort Fairfield wood-burning electric generator has 
been the front page regulatory issue in Maine over the past several months. The apparent 
difficulty of implementing policies to lower electric rates, despite widespread public agreement 
that electric rates are too high, is testimony to the difficulty of implementing consistent public 
policies in the present pluralized political environment. As we go to press, a suit by the Industrial 
Energy Consumer Group (IECG) may delay the finalization of the contract buy-out. Other 
electric power contract renegotiations, which do not require the public approvals necessary for 
the financing from the Finance Authority of Maine (FAME) used in the Fort Fairfield case, 
continue to move ahead, however.  
Less visible, but probably more important in the long run, has been the continuing progress of 
the Public Utilities Commission on the issue of incentive regulation for Maine's two largest 
utilities, Central Maine Power and NYNEX. As the regulatory dockets now stand, some decision 
on incentive regulation for CMP may be forthcoming as early as November 1994. The schedule 
in telecommunications has been delayed by a request by a group of consumers for a review of 
NYNEX's rates, so a decision on incentive regulation will probably not be made before April 
1995.  
Under the "incentive regulation" rubric there is an array of different regulatory approaches that 
vary widely in the degree of flexibility accorded a utility and the extent of the financial gains and 
losses to which the utility may be exposed. At one extreme, substantial parts of a utility's 
business could be deregulated and the remaining, regulated rates subjected to long-term, 
inflation-indexed caps. At the other extreme, a utility might be given little more than the 
opportunity to increase its profits modestly by controlling costs. Any cost savings might be 
shared with customers, and the resulting profits might further be limited to a few percentage 
points above the authorized rate of return. There are also important details about what issues 
continue to be subject to regulatory review and under what conditions either side can abandon 
the incentive regulation plan.  
The outcomes of Maine's deliberations on incentive regulation may be foreshadowed by the 
positions of the various parties. Most participants in the regulatory process have expressed either 
out-right support for incentive regulation or at least some sympathy with the goal of providing 
utilities with better economic incentives. (IECG, which generally opposes fundamental changes 
in regulatory approach, is an exception.) On the other hand, many participants also want 
assurances that any incentive regulation plan will benefit their particular constituency. For 
example, greater pricing flexibility may benefit large businesses with supply alternatives, but 
small customers with fewer options want assurances that they also will benefit from pricing 
flexibility. In electricity, environmental groups are concerned that pricing flexibility will mean a 
policy of promoting electric use, which they feel is inconsistent with current state energy 
policies. And any effort at fundamental reform must look over its shoulder at the results of the 
failed ERAM experiment in electricity. Thus, one might predict that some sort of incentive 
regulation plan is likely for both electricity and telecommunications, but that the degree of 
flexibility afforded the utilities will be narrow. Under this scenario, incentive regulation might 
extend the period between major rate cases but otherwise have limited impact upon either 
customers or utilities. It is also not clear if any of Maine's other, smaller utilities will be 
subjected to incentive regulation.  
Perhaps the current deliberations should not be expected to provide a final, definitive approach to 
incentive regulation, but rather to provide the basis for on-going regulatory reform. In fact, 
simply reducing the frequency of contentious regulatory proceedings is a benefit not to be 
underestimated. The regulatory arena in Maine over the past twenty years has been dominated as 
much by personalities as by policy. Reducing the frequency of the very visible, adversarial 
regulatory proceedings may beneficially shift the focus back onto policies.  
However, there is a real question whether Maine has the time for leisurely regulatory 
experimentation at this point. The combination of national policy developments and 
technological innovation virtually ensure that state regulation of both electricity and 
telecommunications will be subjected to powerful external pressures over the next five years. 
Maine may already be less prepared to respond than states that have already had to manage the 
fundamental changes in natural gas regulation. Any incentive regulation plan needs to be judged 
not simply by its ability to satisfy the current regulatory participants, but more importantly, by 
whether it provides the resiliency to respond to wrenching changes in these two industries.  
The upcoming gubernatorial election has obvious importance for utility regulation, and 
especially for electric regulation. Two of the three major candidates have some past direct 
involvement in utility issues. Joe Brennan, in his previous term as governor, appointed many of 
the commissioners who were associated with the "progressive" policies of the 1970s and 1980s 
that have shaped Maine's electric policy since. Angus King has been involved as an entrepreneur 
in alternative energy projects that benefited from Maine's utility policies. The new governor will 
face an immediate appointment to the Commission in March 1995 (Elizabeth Hughes' seat) and 
have a second appointment in March 1997 (William Nugent's seat). While the March 1995 
appointment will not immediately change the philosophical balance of the Public Utilities 
Commission, it may signal whether the new governor intends to use her or his appointment 
power to shape Maine's utility policies. 
 
